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1  Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
At the beginning of this decade, Dutch 'Rijkswaterstaat' (the infrastructure division of the Ministry of 
Transport) had the visison that template contracts should change from the input-centred type used 
until that time, i.e. contracts specific on all activities and dimensions, to an output-centred type. 
Nevertheless, in 2010, as a senior buyer (employed by this public authority) I still experience on a 
daily basis that contracts are increasing in size and complexity. Although the output is now specified 
in “functions of the desired product”, typical contracts still require a complete set of rules, quality 
assurance plans, verification and validation prescripts etc., restricting the contractor’s own input. The 
entire process of contract management, technical management, organisation management and 
interaction management is prescribed nearly in full. As a result, the contractor has to fulfil all 
documented specifications and checks, despite the fact that such detailed prescriptions do not very 
often reflect the way the contractor is organised or would prefer to work.  
 
The process prescriptions mentioned above are used for controlling the implementation of the 
project. The underlying belief is that when the contractor follows pre-specified rules, the outcome of 
the process will meet the specified standards and the contractor can be trusted. At the same time, 
however, contract managers at Rijkswaterstaat are concerned that the amount of paperwork required 
will distract the focus from the real risks encountered in projects. They also belief that it becomes 
unlikely that there will be any better understanding or trust between contract parties as a result of the 
huge amount of paperwork required or the prescribed processes. Knowledge if such beliefs are 
justified would be very helpful to public work procurement agencies like the one that employs me. It 
would also further facilitate our learning about theories  that offer insights into this problems as well 
as the testing of these theories against practice. 
 
Although the stated policy of Dutch administration is to “leave more to the market” the contracts 
recently signed for infrastructure projects generally seem to become more 'complete' and 
prescriptive. As Incomplete Contract theory suggests, the parties can, in principle, specify their 
respective rights and duties for every possible future state of the world, and at the expense of larger 
contracting costs, complex infrastructure contracts could indeed be made complete. However, 
complete contracts could also lead to mistrust between contracting parties, whereas social controls 
might, on the contrary, lead to more trust between them (Das, 1998). When there is no prior 
experience between parties, and therefore more fear of opportunistic behaviour , contracts seem to 
get more comprehensive and 'complete' (Lu and Ngoi, 2001). These theories and hypotheses are 
difficult to reconcile with the following puzzling observation: although Dutch Rijkswaterstaat 
(RWS) has a stated policy to leave more to the market and to trust and rely on the market (see 
‘inkoopstrategie’ in Agenda 2012), its contracts seem to get more and more complete. The 
phenomenon is unlikely to be the result of previous market experience, as pre selection of 
contracting parties and quality of plans and skills are now commonly used in this area. The stated 
change of contracting policy in the public sector from "specified input contracts" to "output 
contracts", with associated risks shifting to the contractor, should normally have led to exactly the 
opposite phenomenon: more "incomplete" contracts. In such contracts, with more risks transferred to 
contractors, less controls should be designed and less process requirements should be specified in the 
contract.  
 
From practice and experience, it appears to me that the largest portion (over 50%) of contract 
requirements do not contribute directly to the desired outcome or function and may be instead related 
to some form of mistrust. The purpose of this study is therefore to gain insights into why a public 
sector favours the use of complete contracts and therefore mistrusts contractors' capability to 
organize and to act properly on their own. Mistrust appears to be counter-productive: it leads to 
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additional paperwork, without offering additional risk insurance, and as such it distracts parties from 
addressing real risks associated with the projects.  
 
The starting point of my thesis project is thus based on direct observation derived from the 
contracting policy guidelines that Rijkswaterstaat introduced a few years ago. The best way to 
describe the new contracting policy is a brief summary of the RWS Bussinesplan. 
The following excerpt from RWS Bussinesplan: ‘Agenda 2012’  is an indicative statement of the 
policy changes aimed for: 
 
“Dutch Society wants a government that performs better with less staff employed. This is why RWS 
transitions to a professional principal role. Work carried out by Rijkswaterstaat employees that could 
be done by others on the market will be left to the private sector. Especially new infrastructure, and 
maintenance of existing infrastructure, are a matter to be dealt with by construction firms. RWS is 
moving to a more managerial role instead of the executing officer role and will become more of a 
buyer instead of a builder. With innovative contract design  both advising consultants/engineers and 
contractors will have more room to execute contracts by their own understanding. This will 
encourage the market to find affordable and innovative solutions and work more efficient1”.  
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Over the last period of 5 years Rijkswaterstaat has clearly intended to move away from input based 
contracts to output specified contracts. 
 
Input based contracts usually left all risk with the principal, and payments were committed and made 
as initially set. Contracts concluded nowadays transfer most risks to the contractor. For Design Build 
Finance Maintain (“DBFM”) contracts, almost all constructions risks are transferred to the 
contractor. Nevertheless, risks involved with the public using facilities are not always transferred, as 
payment will in most cases be related to the availability instead of the number of cars safely using 
the infrastructure. In these cases the contractor must keep the infrastructure it has produced available 
at certain quality and safety level. Also, the maintenance over the contracting period is left to the 
contractor. The related specific tasks from an infrastructure provider standpoint (for instance, 
incident management, traffic motion control and all legal tasks as a road holder) are not transferred 
however. In conclusion, although a significant portion of risks are transferred, RWS remains, both 
legally and politically, responsible for the service offered to the public. As a result , it finds it 
difficult to ' leave it to the market' without controlling the work that the market achieves, and 
recently output contracts tend to become over-complex, both from a technical point of view, as well 
as from a process management one. Annex A includes an exhibit of a current typical RWS contract 
outline.  
 
Similarly to the goals established in its previous Agenda, RWS has set in its Agenda for 2012 to 
achieve a reduction of transaction costs, and to complete infrastructure projects together with the 
market within set limits. These goals, together with slogans, like “keep it simple”, “first common 
sense, then rules”, “don't use artillery to fight a bug”, do stress the way RWS wants to go. Another 
interesting statement is made in the Agenda: leaving things to the market is only possible when there 
is trust that the market party is willing to deliver the right goods or services. 
 
Concluding in its stated goals, RWS aims for a new way of structuring the principal - agent 
relationship, by shifting contract design from input to output specifications and by transferring risks 
more and more to the market. As emphasized in the Agenda 2012, these aims are only possible to 
achieve with trust in the ability and goodwill of the market. 
 
                                                     
1 RWS, ondernemingsplan , agenda 2012) 
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But do contemporaneous contracts show in fact more trust and are they more or less incomplete than 
before the policy change? On the contrary, they appear to have grown over-complete, to prevent and 
counteract any potential opportunistic behaviour of Contractors. This apparently puzzling 
development needs to be evaluated correctly and understood. 
 
1.3 Relevance 
 
In contracting between two parties there is always concern that the other party might not fulfil its 
commitments as expected. In many transactions very detailed contracts try to specify the rights and 
commitments of each party. The do’s and dont’s are major sections in these contracts. Although they 
specify all requirements and processes, still concerns persist on whether a contract is likely to lead to 
the desired outcome. The risks related to opportunistic behaviour can actually lead to financial loss, 
technical construction failures, political and government policy troubles and even legal issues.  
 
As it is desired that the contracted party fulfil their obligations, it can be very important that the 
inter-firm relationship is monitored carefully and in great detail, although it would be much 
favourable if the contracted party could be trusted to do things the way things should be done. Even 
more, agency costs, administration and discussions could be saved and avoided with enough 'trust' in 
place to realize the goals and objectives. Finding the right balance between control and trust seems 
difficult, especially in the context of Public Private Partnerships (“PPP”) contracts.  
 
PPP contracts are increasing in popularity as there are a number of potential advantages in adopting 
the PPP policy for the provision of government services. Value for money appears to be the main 
rationale for the use of PPP's. This would entail providing the infrastructure asset and any ancillary 
services at least cost compared to conventional government procurement. This is based on the 
assumption that quality standards are maintained as per the contract specifications. Risk transfer is 
another potential benefit. In essence, the party best able to manage risks at least cost should manage 
it. PPP's allow for greater predictability of costs for the government and revenues for the private 
company since both of these are articulated in the contract (Sciulli,2008). Other advantages 
mentioned in literature are the spread of funds over a lengthy period although this long term 
agreement can also be a disadvantage when changing circumstances or needs make a renegotiation 
necessary.  
 
Apparently, contracts are written starting from a perception of mistrust, and as a result, they consist 
of a large number of behavioural controls explicitly stated in the contract.   
 
From both a theoretical and practical perspective, it would be useful to determine whether there 
could be a prominent role for trust in complex public work contracts and whether more trust would 
ultimately lead to better performances. 
 
Could more trust prevent contract writers from creating even larger and more complex contracts? 
Can trust replace formal controls or are the latter better to manage a contract? To answer such 
questions, it is necessary to know how a contract is used and interpreted, as this may have an 
important impact on the issues mentioned before.  
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2  Theoretical framework and research question 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
This study is based on the existing academic literature on trust, control and contracts. 
 
The incomplete contracts theory (Hart and Moore, 1988) puts forward the idea that contracts are 
usually incomplete because it would be prohibitively expensive to write a complete contract. When a 
dispute arises and the specific situation is not included in the contract, either both parties must 
engage in bargaining or the court must step in and fill the gap. The idea of a complete contract is 
closely related to the notion of default rules, e.g. legal rules that will fill the gap in a contract in the 
absence of a provision agreed upon by all parties. More recent developments in the theory of 
incomplete contracts turn the focus on the incentive effects of parties' inability to write complete 
contingent contracts, e.g. concerning relationship-specific investments. Because it would be 
impossibly complex and costly for parties to come to an agreement to make their contract complete, 
the law provides default rules which fill in the gaps in the actual agreement of the parties. 
 
In their paper on contractual flexibility for public private partnerships, Athias et al. (2007) describe 
the trade off between rigid and flexible contracts. They suggest that although a more rigid contract 
for long term PPS infrastructure projects can only be favourable over a flexible contract if certain 
conditions are met. The conditions mentioned were: maladaption costs, renegotiation costs, and the 
probability to see the contract enforced and met. Furthermore their results stress the fact that the 
institutional environment in which the contract is embedded matters.  
 
Other insights come from agency theory. Trailer et al. [2004] consider that many of the reported 
difficulties in realizing the benefits of PPPs emanate from conflicting goals between three major PPP 
stakeholders. The first one is the public authority, whose objectives are job creation and increasing 
services to the public. The second is the private partner, whose objective is to maximize the value 
derived from the arrangement. The third party is the consumer or the community, whose aim to 
maximize consumer surplus/social welfare.  In highlighting this “compound agency problem”, i.e. 
multiple conflicting interests created by the multiple parties involved, Trailer et al. flag the potential 
for conflicting incentives and interests present in PPP arrangements to produce negative social 
consequences in public infrastructure and service provision. 
 
In the literature on trust, controls and contract in inter-firm relationships, several interesting 
hypotheses are presented. Das and Teng (2001) investigated the relationship between trust and 
contract and concluded that trust and contracts can well complementary because contracts are in 
practice often not used and interpreted in a strictly legal fashion, with opportunism as a central focus 
point. This suggests that when trust in the partner is high, the formal controls are seldom used and of 
less importance. Das and Teng (2001) also consider that perceived relational risk in an alliance will 
be reduced more effectively by behaviour control than by output control, although output control is 
more effective to reduce the perceived performance risk in an alliance. Perceived performance risk in 
an alliance will be reduced more effectively by output control than by behaviour control. Their fifth 
hypothesis: “Social control in an alliance will reduce both perceived relational risk and perceived 
performance risk” can and should be further investigated. 
 
Klien et al. (2006) also argue that contracts and trust need not be substitutes, but actual complements. 
Indeed, formal control — that is, behaviour control and output control — may undermine trust, 
because the employment of strict rules and objectives means that members do not have the autonomy 
to decide what works best. Members’ goodwill is thrown in doubt. As a result, an atmosphere of 
mistrust is created. Social control, on the other hand, influences people’s behaviour through creating 
shared goals and norms. This process increases mutual understanding — and is thus trust-breeding. 
Whereas the above argument is primarily concerned with goodwill trust, a similar logic would apply 
to competence trust. First, when specific outcome measures (or output controls) are used in an 
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alliance, the implication is that a firm does not fully trust the competence of its partner to decide 
what is best for the alliance. A lack of trust leads to the conclusion that outcomes need to be 
frequently checked against preset measures and objectives. An emphasis on outcome measures can 
also create the impression that a partner needs to meet the targets on its own. Such an impression of 
being left to its devices in situations involving downside risk may also create anxieties that could 
erode competence trust. Furthermore, output control gives partner firms little leeway in pursuing 
long-term objectives at the cost of certain short-term targets, because alliance outcomes will be 
constantly and closely monitored. 
 
Klien et. al (2006) have, on the other hand, shown why “trust and contracts can well be complements 
because contracts are in practice often not used and interpreted in a strictly legal fashion with 
opportunism as a central focus point”. The authors advise that studies should not be pointed at the 
presence, completeness or existence off the contract, and suggest that further research should focus 
on: 
1 the precise content of clauses included, 
2 the intention with which the contract is drawn up, 
3 the actual use of the contract. 
 
In conclusion, the relationship between contracts and trust has been subject of many studies, the 
consensus in the literature is that trust and contracts are substitutes, and the following 
correspondence should generally hold: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relation trust and contract completeness 
 
When trust is high, there is no need for complete contracts. 
 
 
If, however, the actual observations do not confirm this theoretical proposition, it does not 
automatically follow that the theory is false: trust and contracts might only misleadingly appear to be 
complements, not substitutes, because “contracts are in practice often not used and interpreted in a 
strictly legal fashion”.  
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2.2 Research objective 
 
According to prior studies, most contracts consist of a mix of desired behaviour clauses and specified 
performance provisions. In the case of infrastructure projects, however, the appeal of specifying the 
desired behaviour, in addition to the desired outcome, and both contracting parties’ role in it, is often 
not clear.  The question is: “Why are contracts structured to include process requirement 
provisions?”.  If such clauses are reflective of mistrust, then it follows that the 
incentives/disincentives provided for in contracts would be related to the main risks. Is this the case 
in reality? We can learn whether this is indeed the case or not, from existing contracts, their content 
and their actual enforcement. 
 
As suggested in prior literature, useful insights would be gained by examining not only the content 
but also the actual use of contracts and thus determine whether the contract completeness at RWS is 
a result of actual mistrust, as reflected in process requirements and quality requirements, or whether 
it is in fact the consequence of exogenously imposed factors, e.g. regulations like NEN quality, 
ARBO , financial statements regulations or, possibly, the specifics of the required outcome, e.g. the 
complexity of infrastructure projects is quite high, requiring the drawing up of very complex 
contracts.   
 
From practitioners’ perspective, it is considered that two different approaches to PPP could be taken: 
contracting based primarily on trust as reflected in slim/compact contracts and contracting based on 
all encompassing contracts. Why these two different approaches are chosen and how they work out 
is important to public work authorities.  The study might explain why contracts get ever more 
comprehensive, although the opposite, i.e. leaner contracts should have been more likely to transpire, 
given the political idea of leaving it up to the market. Finally, the research may shed light on the 
connection between social controls and trust.  
 
The main objective of this thesis remains, however, to explore and identify the factors, mistrust or 
some other factor, that drive the observed increase in contracts completeness in public work 
procurement at RWS, given that the ‘new’ policy agenda this public institution has set is to operate 
in a more open and constructive way, with outcome based results clearly specified. 
 
An answer to this question could be found by investigating how contract managers design actual 
public work procurement contracts, determine the proportion of “controls” to be found in their 
content, and inquire about the motivation they have for placing such “controls” in contracts.  
 
A second objective of the study is assess whether contracts based on output control, i.e. based up 
on trust in the quality and ability of the contract partner, are perceived as equally likely to get the 
desired outcome as much as the complete contracts designed and used currently.  
 
An answer to this question could be found by researching how contract managers interpret and 
actually enforce public work procurement contracts. 
 
Before data collection and analysis are performed, a tentative answer to the following questions must 
be also provided:  
- How is “trust” reflected in contracts? What content clause type reflects the degree of trust in 
practice (e.g. behaviour control)? 
- What is understood by the term Social Control? Can social controls replace behavioural controls? 
Can trust be based on social controls and (limited?) output controls? What is the role of third parties 
in these relationships? 
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3  Methodology 
 
3.1. Research methods description 
 
This study is empirical and exploratory. It uses qualitative and quantitative data collected from the 
contents of several PPP contracts and interviews with contract managers in order to find out what 
factor drives the tendency of these Dutch infrastructure contracts toward complexity and 
comprehensiveness, i.e. complete contracts. 
 
This case study analysis is performed on 3 public work infrastructure contracts: two PPP contracts 
and a long-term public procurement contract (design, construct and maintain over a 10 year period). 
Direct interviews are also conducted to assess the actual use of contractual provisions in order to 
validate whether this tendency bears a relationship with existing mistrust in the private market 
partners. Additionally, a comparison to a more or less incomplete infrastructure contract gives 
additional information on what kind of issues are unforeseen in the incomplete contract that do exist 
in a complete contract. Finally, the analysis is geared toward finding out whether there are 
differences in the way the two different types of contracts are designed and actually enforced. 
 
As mentioned, the research is aimed at exploring how PPP contracts are designed, interpreted and 
enforced. The major part of this research is a case study, which contrasts two comprehensive 
'complete' contracts and a lean 'incomplete' contract in order to get more insight into the drivers of 
the differences in approach.  
 
Based on collected data and observations, an analysis was made to determine whether a “complete” 
contract is indeed perceived as necessary to build efficient inter-firm relationships and obtain good 
results, or whether, possibly, some limited output control, based upon trust in the quality and ability 
of the contract partner, would also suffice to achieve the desired outcome. 
 
 3.2. Concepts operationalization 
 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish what types of controls and clauses in contracts reflect the degree 
of trust.  
 
In practice, trust could be entirely based on experience and tacit knowledge. Thus, it is uncertain 
which types of controls provided for in contracts are indeed a reflection of the existing degree of 
mistrust. Nevertheless, process requirement clauses, which specify a contractor how he should 
design, built, organise, maintain, audit, verify or manage the work or technical requirements that are 
'input based', are more likely to reflect mistrust than clauses that prescribe the use of laws, general 
processes or standards. 
 
As mentioned before, the main hypothesis investigated in this research project is that more complete 
contracts are evidence of less trust in contractors and that the lack of trust justifies why managers and 
contract writers are focusing on process instead of goals and results. In this study, mistrust is a term 
used interchangeably with the terms “perceived performance risk” and “relational risk”.  
 
The Concept of Mistrust is operationalized as the sum of any requirement stated in a contract which 
prescribes the way the desired outcome is to be achieved, but which, on its own, does not lead to the 
desired outcome. An example is the auditing process required for ISO 90012. On its own, the 
                                                     
2 International Organization for Standardization, responsible for the ISO 9000, ISO 14000, ISO 27000, ISO 22000 and other 
international management standards. 
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fulfilment of this requirement does not contribute to the construction of for example, a bridge, but 
gives confidence and guarantees about the way it is achieved.  
 
By categorising the precise content of clauses included in a contract, it becomes possible to establish 
which clauses are mistrust-related and their relative proportion in a very comprehensive contract. 
Categorization also allows the comparison of differences in the amount of requirements or 
specifications between contracts. The percentages of categories of requirements (process 
requirement, specified technical input or desired output) are contrasted. 
 
Secondly, the term “Social control” and its relationships with contracts and trust needs defining.  
 
Social control can best be described as an attitude, a positive behaviour, towards realizing a shared 
goal. Teamwork and reliance on each others task can be seen, for example, in a soccer team, where it 
is clear that victory can only be achieved by scoring more goals then the opposing team. For a team 
it is also clear that in a team of 11 players it will be possible only for one or somefew players to 
score goals. Nevertheless the other team members are essential to secure a win, as a good defence 
system is also a must. In a soccer team the social control is obvious, and witnessed by thousands of 
‘experts’ the fans will not hesitate to pass judgement on team players that do not contribute to the 
ultimate goals. 
 
Das and Teng (2001) consider that social control influences people’s behaviour through creating 
shared goals and Values. This process increases mutual understanding, and it is thus trust-breeding.  
 
But can trust be based on social controls and output controls? In practice the argued goal congruence 
within partnerships is not clear and recognised. As a result, behaviour is not focussed on the project-
goals but on short term success. When contracts shift towards more goal congruence, both parties 
will likely be more interested in the results of output controls as both will have to realise preset 
goals. The author’s direct experience suggests that trust can not be based on social controls alone. 
Positive results on output controls do however increase trust. 
 
Thirdly, it should be clarified if social controls are or can be substitutes for behavioural controls, and 
what role play third parties in this relationship. 
 
Social controls are probably the best controls to realise a project, although this depends on the 
relationship between the people involved. Two out of three RWS contracts do rely on behavioural 
controls to manage the contractor. These controls are often specified in detail and leave only little 
room for interpretation. This might be inefficient, but is also contrary to the market philosophy stated 
by RWS in the agenda 2012. This philosophy gears up to a more productive way of cooperation 
between RWS and contractors. In this there should be more room for social controls, than based on 
more shared goals, and less behavioural controls.  
 
Interestingly, the most diverging goal  between contractor and principal in both short term and long 
term contracts is the financial one: contractors want to maximize profit and secure long term return 
on investments whereas the principal would be better off when contractors achieve the opposite 
result. Therefore, contractors need to make a good profit on projects and are keen on receiving extra 
orders. Nevertheless, DBFM contracts also involve converging goals between contractors and 
principal. Table 1 summarizes and compares intrinsic goal congruence between DBFM contract and 
short term contract. 
 
 
Table 1: Goal congruence comparison between DBFM and DB contracts 
 DBFM DB 
Goals Contractor Principal Contractor Principal 
Delivery date High High Medium High 
Contractors Profit High Low High Low 
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Optimise Life cycle costs High High Low High 
Availability of service High High Low High 
Quality assurance High High Medium High  
Legend:  
Green:  goal congruence between Contractor and Principal; 
Medium:  indifference attitude towards goal; 
Red:   diverging goals between Contractor and Principal. 
 
 
 
Third parties can be helpful to execute the controls that result from the contracts obligations 
standpoint. They are helpful in preventing arguments over contract details and execution, and thus 
fostering a better relationship.  As a result, whenever social controls play an important role, it might 
be very helpful to use a third party to audit the processes leading to the outcome and play the role a 
referee plays in football.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
Three different typical contracts have been investigated. The contracts are referred to as Contract A, 
B and C.  
 
Contract A is a contract for the design, build, finance and maintenance of a large and relatively 
complicated Tunnel, the second “Coentunnel”. This  project is multidisciplinary, therefore the 
contract itself has detailed technical specifications as well as a description of the performance 
measurement system, on which financial payments are based.  
 
Contract B is related to a somewhat less complicated work, the design, building, financing and 
maintenance of e new motorway in the North of Holland. It is less detailed in technical specification 
and the functional outcome is the main focus of the requirements. 
 
Contract C is a relatively small contract for the design, building and maintenance of a radar and 
communication system for the Amsterdam Harbour, a so called Vessel traffic system. This contract 
uses the ‘standard’ AV GCi contract models, but the technical specifications are detailed and consist 
of numerous appendices. These appendices where not part of this study because? (please give a 
justification). 
 
The selection is therefore based on 3 recent contracts that include a maintenance component. This 
was done as these contract types are in theory most suitable for an incomplete contract. When the 
contractor’s performance is poor, he will be confronted with problems during the maintenance 
period. These types of contracts involve the strong post-completion warranty, and in theory there is 
no need to specify them to detail since they have this self-enforcing component. The longterm 
relationship is another factor that makes these contract types perfectly suitable to propel the new 
market strategy with is room for partnership and trust.  
 
The direct data collection from actual content was validated with data collected from a questionnaire 
that was send to a selection of 10 contract managers. Eight contract managers returned the 
questionnaire. The contract managers had been selected based on their experience with the contracts 
of study and on their experience with new contract types with UAV-GC integrated contract forms 
(Design and Build, sometimes Maintain). 
 
The empirical analysis of contracts content is based on data and observations collected in several 
steps: 
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3.3.1 Step 1: Categorize and quantify the relative frequency of contract requirement types  
 
The following categorization is used: 
 
 Category 1a: Outcome (functional) requirements 
Includes requirements that prescribe: 
- 13a) the desired outcome; 
- 13b) the desired functions;  
- 13c) data for milestones; 
- 13d) financial payments. 
This category includes all requirements that refer and contribute to the function and use of the 
infrastructure product. Take for instance a tunnel, an example of such clause is the following: “… 
tunnel tubes must be equipped with a speed detection system to signal slow runners and ‘speed 
discrimination’ from the traffic operation location.” 
 
 
 Category 1b: Outcome (technical) requirements 
Includes technical requirements that are 'input based'. 
This category includes all requirements containing detailed technical information. For example with 
a tunnel, a clause on the emergency lighting might require: “… distance between emergency lights 
needs to be 12,5 meters from centre to centre.” 
 
 Category 2: Laws and standards requirements 
Includes requirements that prescribe: 
- 2a) the use of laws 
- 2b) general processes or standards or 
- 2c) what was derived from such provisions 
As an example the following clause: “When conflicts in documents arise between document(s) of the 
(?) contractor and other parts of this agreement (from principal) the other parts will prevail.” 
 
 Category 3: Process requirements 
Includes process requirements that specify the contractor how to: 
- 31a) Design 
- 31b) Build  
- 31c) Organise  
- 31d) Maintain  
- 31e) Audit 
- 31f)  Verify 
- 31g) Manage 
This category includes all clauses that refer to the way the contractor should manage the process. For 
example: “The management system must be written down in the management plan, that should 
comply to ISO/IEC 15288 or ISO 9001.” Another example is: “The contractor is responsible for 
possible safety and health plans for subcontractors and suppliers. He must be able to present his 
verifications and tests.” 
 
 Category 4: Miscellaneous requirements 
This residual category includes all requirements not possible to be classified under 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
For example the following clause: ” .. replaceable parts should be visually inspectable without means 
of help.” As in this case the contractor is responsible for inspection and service there seems to be no 
need for this requirement. 
 
Based on data obtained from categorised contract clauses, the hypothesis that mistrust (as expressed 
in the relative use of input based requirement clauses versus desired outcome clauses) is the driver of 
additional contract complexity can be examined.  
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When the categorisation and quantification of requirements has been finalized, the findings from step 
1, regarding the relative weight given to process requirements in contracts, can be further tested and 
validated by contract writers and managers via a directly administrated questionnaire.   
 
Contract managers are asked to rank, in terms of relative importance (in decreasing importance on a 
scale from 1 to 8) the following parameters of contract execution: 
 Time  
 Money 
 Quality (outcome) 
 Quality during execution 
 Explicit and verifiable working process 
 Verifiable working (?operation ?work) as per process requirements 
 Cooperation 
 Safety at building space (?construction area) 
 
3.3.2 Step 2: Validation questionnaires filled out by contract managers 
 
The contract managers have been asked to qualify each of the following statements as true, neutral or 
false:  
 
1. Process requirements force contractors to deliver a good result 
2. A contractor that respects the RWS process standards delivers a good result 
3. Contracts that do specify detailed technical requirements lead to good results 
4. Only contracts specified up to functions have led to better solutions 
5. Systems engineering leads to better solutions 
6. Systems engineering (to functions) will safe money 
7. The obligation to follow the contractors own quality system has lead to better results 
8. Only the obligation to follow the specified quality system will lead to better results 
9. A contract can never be executed in full detail: there need to be room for interpretation 
10. Contractors do the utmost to realize principal goals concerning time, money and quality  
11. Contractors main goal is to realize his own financial targets 
12. Contractors are only interested in principals goals as a financial incentive is involved 
13. Incomplete contracts will almost certainly NOT lead to contractor claims as result of a possible room for 
interpretations 
14. Contractors are very concerned about the contractor-principal relationship 
15. RWS contracts are over-complete and specified to unnecessary detail 
16. RWS contracts are smart and efficient 
17. RWS contracts lack process requirements 
18. Some Process requirements can easily be left out as they are never executed 
19. RWS is capable to judge the contractors results 
20. Cooperation on a trustworthy base will lead to a better realisations of goals 
21. Principal goals are a fixed item on regular project meetings 
22. With some more trust and reliance in the market, projects would be executed more efficient 
 
3.3.3 Step 3:  Finding out how the contract is actually enforced 
 
Given that written clauses might be practically irrelevant, discarded, and not actually used, it is also 
important to learn more about the way behaviour controls do really matter in the execution of 
contracts. This is the objective of Step 3. 
 
Most contract managers believe that once a project starts other commitments and risks of the 
contractors will distract them from focusing on the content of the contract.  
 
Therefore it is useful to observe how strictly contracts are enforced if this widely held belief turns 
out to be an actual threat. Evaluation reports, contract change on this subject etc. can be good and 
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helpful instruments here. Maybe a simple review of some topics can also be of use. The aim is to 
determine whether contract managers argue with contractors about the main objectives of the 
contract or whether contract meetings are used to argue about items and risks that are not of main 
importance for the realization of essential contract goals.  
 
Data can be collected from weekly reports with the main risks identified in order to count the amount 
of attention that has been given to any risk. Analysis of the reports may reveal how contracts are 
used and enforced:  
- Do contracts reflect and cover the most dominnant risks identified? 
- Is management information based on parameters within the contract (for example work 
breakdown structure elements?) 
- On what (other) source of data is management information based? 
- What are the main issues discussed in project meetings? 
- Are contract incentives (bonus/fee) executed? 
- Are all process requirements (data scheduled, reports prescribed, etc.) strictly followed? 
The prior belief here is that behavioural controls distract focus from the results that matter and are 
instead directed, primarily and frequently, on details. 
 
Based on the observations and analyses done in previous steps, it is possible to evaluate whether the 
behavioural controls provided for in contracts are perceived as necessary, in this type of contract, in 
order to achieve more efficient inter-firm relationships and to lead to the desired outcomes.  
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4  Results 
 
4.1 Step 1: Analysing based on categorization of clauses in Public Work contracts 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics on contract requirements 
 
Contract requirements 
 
The three contracts mentioned in the previous section have been examined in  detail. The 
requirements were divided into different groups. The aim of this classification was to gain more 
insights in the way these contracts were designed. Are the requirements related to some form of 
mistrust or are they essential to secure the outcome desired? 
The perspective from which the classification was made is that since contractors are selected after a 
prequalification, in which they should show their ability to handle large infrastructure projects, it 
proves their capability in (accessing) technical design and building knowledge.  In short: contractors 
are qualified for the job. 
 
The contract requirements are divided into four categories: 
- Category 1a and 1b: Outcome requirements, i.e. requirements that prescribe the desired 
outcome in functions, and the basic set of agreements, thus  considered as essential.  
- Category 2: Technical requirements that are input based, and in fact are a limitation to the 
contractors design possibilities. These requirements are considered to be a result of mistrust, 
as they are intended for a part of or for complete systems that can very well be designed and 
engineered by the contractor.  
- Category 3: Process requirements, i.e. those that prescribe how the contractor should 
organise his work, how to interact with involved parties or how to verify his results. Such 
requirements might be an over-specification related to mistrust. 
- Category 4: Miscellaneous requirements are often related to mistrust like the prescription of 
laws and standards. 
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Table 2: Contract requirements: –  frequency and relative weight given to mistrust-related 
clauses  
 
Requirement  Contract A       Contract B  Contract C  
 N % N % N % 
Outcome/(functional) 794 34 %  158   32% 1051 49% 
 
Input (technical) 792 35 % 79   16% 415 19% 
Process 384 17 % 149  30% 612 29% 
Laws/standards 321  14 % 112 22% 68 3% 
Total 2291  498  2146  
         
 
 
Table 3: Frequency and relative use of contract requirements  that could be related to mistrust in 
contractors 
Requirement (%) Contract A Contract B Contract C 
Necessary   48 %   54 % 52 % 
 
Mistrust related  52 %  46 % 48%  
Table 1 and 2 based on a survey of 3 contracts. 
 
 
 
4.1.2  Results of contract requirements analysis 
 
First I selected 3 different contracts3, referred to as contract A, B and C and divided the 
requirements. Then data on frequency and relative use of each category was collected.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2 presented in the previous section and from  Figure 2 below, in all 3 
contracts about 50% of the requirements are not strictly essential in having the contractor deliver the 
desired outcome. Instead, these requirements show detailed information on how the contractor 
should be organised, and on how he should design or manage the project.  
 
 
                                                     
3 Contract A: a DBFM contract for an infrastructure Tunnel, B a DBFM contract for a new 
motorway,  C a DBM contract for a Radar/Vessel Tracking System.  
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Figure 2: contract requirements divided  
 
 %  
 
Figure 2: Requirements for 3 contracts grouped by percentage of the total number of 
requirements in the contract. 
 
 
The results point to several remarkable findings:  
 
For contract A, which seems a fairly complete contract, it is remarkable that there are many 
requirements that prescribe technical solutions by defining a technical scope instead of the functions 
needed.  
 
There seems to be little faith in the contractor, as technical solutions that the principal had in mind 
are often specified in detail in this contract. 
 
An example of over-specification found in this contract is the exact specification of an emergency-
locker. These lockers are positioned beside the road, in a tunnel, and consist of a fire extinguisher, a 
telecom connection and other safety equipment.  This is a fairly minor part, yet critical when needed, 
but not specifically critical for the primary function of the foreseen infrastructure. The contract 
further specifies extensively: all RAL colours of the locker, the door, the background, the 
extinguisher hinges and the extinguisher handheld. Then the minimum size of the written 
instructions is given in mm and the exact instruction is specified.  Also the positioning height for the 
extinguisher and telephone are prescribed at 1.60 meter, to prevent the contractor from constructing a 
security device difficuly to reach for by human beings’.  Although RWS leaves it to the market, there 
is obviously no faith in the contractor’s ability to construct an usable emergency locker that meets 
the necessary functionality requirements. Also, the tendency for completeness in this contract is 
shown by the exact figures for the amount of water the road should be able to absorb in case of 
heavy rain. Though the main goal is that the road should be safe to drive on, without standing water 
which presents the risk for aquaplaning. This can be seen as a way of quantifying and imposing 
smart requirements, on the other hand it can also be seen as an over specification. 
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For contract B the most obvious difference in comparison with contract A is that it has far less 
requirements. Specifically it has few technical requirements. The specified outcome is partly 
integrated with requirements I considered financial as they relate performance with financial results. 
The specified function itself leaves room for optimization by the contractor, although contractor has 
to meet the concession as agreed upon after political agreement. So we can consider this contract as 
‘incomplete’ for the technical specs. Process specifications are just as complete as for contract A, 
and can be regarded as more complete.  
 
Contract C also appears to be a complete contract: it is not an actual PPP contract, but maintenance 
and availability over a 10 year period are an integral part of the contract. It is a project for a radar 
system guiding ships to enter the Amsterdam harbour safely. The radar system will monitor the 
movements of each ship and facilitate a quick and reliable sailing time with less interruptions at the 
lock doors in seaport IJmuiden. As a result of the chosen contract form the contractor is responsible 
for quality, and therefore there would be no need to prescribe his process in detail. The contract 
demands are functional, although some functions do refer to detailed technical specifications and can 
be considered as functional, but they are overly complete too. 
 
Relevant to questions regarding trust is also the issue of non-contractual warranties, which are 
embedded in the way the selection of contractors is achieved. RWS uses an advanced set of pre-
qualification requirements. Turnover, experience on execution of certain projects based on the 
project budgets, or skills on technical or specific design issues is the first step in creating trust and 
confidence.  
 
The next step is the quality management plan, in which a contract bidder must show his capability 
and specify his solution for some preset problems. This plan is rated by a commission and is also 
introduced to reduce the risks of contracting an incapable contractor.  
 
Then there is a financial measure: requesting a statement from a Dutch Bank (Bank warranty) must 
secure the financial situation of contractors.  
 
Related to trust in contracts the following is worth mentioning: 
- although goals like deadlines and amount due are included in the primary contract 
documents, other goals like traffic management, trust in the management process of the 
contractor, systems engineering (as a traceable way of designing) and image building are not 
specified in the primary part. 
- A form of balanced scorecard, with main goals for every role of the IPM model and for the 
contractor was not included in the 3 contracts, although it could have been helpful in 
measuring the amount of trust a contractor gained over the project.  
 
 
4.1.3 What factors  might explain contracts’ completeness? 
 
Can it be concluded from the finding of the contract requirements analysis that Mistrust is the 
driving factor of contracts’ completeness? Contract C, for example, uses a fairly complete standard 
process specification, but contract writers for this contract added about 30% (estimated) additional 
requirements. 
Process controls can also be seen as substitutes for trust. Next to the technical specifications there are 
abundant process requirements. In contract A and B though, a fair part of the process requirements 
are left to the contractor. But nevertheless these process requirements, partly specified by the 
contractor in his management specifications, are part of the contract. RWS will audit the contractors 
work by following his own process as specified.  
 
The research question on whether mistrust is the driver of all this additional contract complexity can 
not be fully answered on findings in the contract alone, since there might be other factors that 
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determine setting of detailed technical requirements. However, based on the observed detailed 
specifications on minor issues it looks likely that mistrust is a prominent factor here.  
 
Nevertheless, based on the findings from the categorisation of requirements several ‘drivers’ for 
complete contracts can be assumed: 
  
- Technical experience accumulated by principal: the issue mentioned for contract A above, where 
detailed specifications were given for a minor and not difficult part, seems illustrative for the 
problem the RWS organisation faces. Solutions and experience that have been gained over a period 
of many years can not be easily transposed to the market by a functionally specified contract.  
 
- Internal communication issues: Contracts are usually written by experts in several disciplines. 
Technicians write the technical specification (VS1) (outcome or function) whereas financial and 
juridical staff prepare the process requirements (VS2). When asking contract writers for some details 
I learned that technical staff, who are responsible for technical specifications, have little faith in the 
process requirements in the contract. As a result some detailed specifications end up in the contract 
to prevent opportunistic behaviour of contractors. On the other hand in the process requirements 
there are other measures foreseen to prevent opportunistic behaviour, as the contractor should verify 
his solutions to the demands set. A possible cause of over-complete contracts may be a result of 
insufficient knowledge of the complete contract by contract writers. This could be interesting for 
further investigation within the RWS organisation. 
 
- Legitimization issues related to public task and responsibility: For process requirements the 
conclusion can not be based on findings on the contract specifications per se. Although the wish to 
specify the management process in the contract can be seen as some form of mistrust that leads to 
specifications, because if the principal had full trust in the management process and capability of the 
contractor he would not have specified this process. An alternative explanation however can be 
found in the wish of Rijkswaterstaat to be seen as committed and informed to fulfil its public tasks 
and responsibility.  
 
The information collected in the next step of this research will help answering the questions above, 
as the meaning of the findings will be verified to the views and perceptions of contract managers on 
the underlying drivers of contract completeness.  
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4.2 Step 2: Analysis of contract managers motivation driving the content of contracts  
 
4.2.1 Mistrust 
 
My prior belief is that complete contracts are evidence of low levels of trust in contractors which 
compel managers and contract writers to focus on process instead of goals and results.  Mistrust is a 
term used interchangeably with the terms “perceived performance risk” and “relational risk”. The 
concept of Mistrust  has been  operationalized as the sum of any requirement stated in a contract 
which prescribes the way the desired outcome is to be achieved, and which, on is own, does not lead 
to the desired outcome. 
 
 
There seems to be not only limited trust in the capability’s of the market but there also seems to be 
little confidence in the attitude of contractors. Although a variety of reasons has been named, 
contract managers stated the following arguments and reasons for drawing over-complete contracts: 
1. A complete contract is not wrong: it takes more time to write it, but one improves the  
probability that the desired solution is attained; 
 
2. Should be used to impose the design of proven and solid solutions; 
 
3. Former negative experiences (technical, financial or legal disputes with contractors); 
 
4. RWS finds itself /is held responsible for the infrastructure availability despite passing this 
contractual risk on to contractors ; 
 
5. Lack of experience/expertise with functional specifications; 
 
6. Process controls must be used to compensate for the lack of technical know-how; 
 
7. Consultants may have an incentive to create difficult problems with difficult solutions, as 
they get paid on an hourly basis;  
 
8. Legal and other public parties require detailed solutions; 
 
9. RWS has struggled over accountability and controllability with internal financial auditors 
over the past decade;  
 
 
Justifications like 1), 2), 3) and 4) do point toward a mistrust in contractor expertise or goodwill, but 
all other explanations provided by contract writers reveal that issues unrelated to trust might also be 
responsible for an input or process requirement over specification. They indicate that the change of 
policy regarding PPP contracts has not been accompanied by institutional changes that would 
support actual application of the new policy: consultants’ incentives are the same as before, the 
training for a new set of skills has been neglected; the system of accountability and audit went 
unmodified.  
 
Without an alignment of incentive and accountability system, it is only reasonable that contract 
writers and contract managers would not alter their behaviour and underlying belief system.  
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4.2.2 Could more trust be an alternative? 
 
In interviews held with RWS contract managers there seems to be no consensus about the use and 
effects of process requirements in contracts. Although there are benefits expected for any contractor 
working by his own quality system there is no consensus whether this has led to better products. 
However there is a strong consensus about the attitude of contractors: their main goal is profit 
maximization, and there seems to be little respect for goals set by the principal if there is no financial 
punishment involved.  
 
I received quite remarkable answers from contract writers and managers to questions about the 
optimum level of trust. Their answers were unanimous that when working together, based on trust, 
this would lead to a better realisation of the goals set. The answers also indicate that when there 
would be more trust in the market capabilities all ‘would work out better’. Nevertheless, the same 
contract managers also stipulate that from experience, contractors do not hesitate to claim extra 
money when small loopholes (unclear requirements in contracts) allow them to do so. There is 
consensus among contract managers that RWS contracts are too complex and specified in too much 
to detail. Contract managers state that these details do not contribute to the achieving of higher 
quality output.  
 
Although this sample opinion survey is likely not representative for all contract managers,  it still 
indicates that as a group contract managers do believe in the expertise of their contractors. On the 
other hand they are well aware that for most contractors the goal of making a profit is more 
important then the principal’s interest and their relation.  
 
Contract managers unanimously believed that a very rigid / over specified contract is impossible to 
manage: there is a need for a little margin to execute it.  They are also unanimous that working in 
strict conformity with the specified process requirements is less important to them. Safety is 
considered the most important attribute of the project. 
 
These interviews also revealed that contract managers do rely on the management, audit and 
verification system of their contractors. Only risks that are defined as highly material, i.e. as the 
product of probability of occurrence and financial consequence, stipulated in financial terms above a 
million euro, are set to be monitored and audited in detail. As a result, the inconsequential detailed 
requirements, those typically ‘over’ specified in contracts, are not followed up during the execution 
of the contract by other parties, but only by the contractor.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusion step 2 
 
My prior belief was that complete contracts show less trust in contractors and are focusing on the 
process instead of goals and results. To evaluate this opinion proved to be difficult. Based on the 
findings of this research one can however conclude that at RWS there is a strong relation between  
the degree of trust and contract completeness. As a result of mistrust in the behaviour  of contractors, 
there is a strong motivation to specify contracts deeply. This leads to detailed process requirements 
in the contract, to detailed technical specifications as well as to a strong selection process.  
 
Interviews with contract managers gave strong indications that the following statements hold truth: 
 
- Contracts are indeed often over-complete, but contract managers indicated that many 
technical or process details are not of major importance to them. This lack of importance is 
also supported by the way contracts are enforced; 
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- Contract managers do believe in the ability of their contractors to deliver good solutions, but 
expect them to behave opportunistic, if given the chance; 
 
- Most contractors are believed not to be really interested in trust or principals relationship, as 
most of them use each possibility to claim extra money or time; 
 
- Contracts do have only limited goal congruence, and even for PPP contracts the theoretical 
advantage in keeping the contractor responsible for his own life cycle costs does not always 
lead to the desired outcome. The reason for this is most probably the new role of the funding 
company, which is in effect the party confronted with malfunctions; 
 
- The most important factors from contract managers point of view, safety, time and budget, 
are the ones least specified in the contract. 
 
 
4.3 Step 3: How the contract is actually enforced: the execution of contracts 
 
My prior belief is that behavioural controls distract focus on the results that matter and are often 
focussed on details primarily. 
 
4.3.1 Contract management: system based contract management 
 
This type of contracts is managed at RWS by using a mix of audits, dedicated to various risks. This 
is called “systeemgerichte contract beheersing (SCB)”, i.e. system based contract management. The 
system is based on the management system that the contractor operates. The underlying assumption 
of this management system is that the contractor verifies and audits his own processes and results. 
When the contractors systems operates well there will be Deming’s ‘Plan -> Do -> Check -> Act 
cycle’  a quality improvement spiral for improving processes. RWS defines a contract management 
plan and thorough risk management processes or products are audited by RWS.  
 
This method of contract management is only possible when there is a lot of trust in the contractor, as 
results and payments are primarily based on paperwork from the contractor. In fact for bigger PPP 
contracts the audit materiality limit is well over 1 million euro. This means that only processes or 
products that have a determined risk above this value will be verified or audited. Other processes will 
not be checked, beside a simple verification whether a product is delivered but without checking the 
quality.  
 
So the question arises up why technical requirements are specified in such detailed manner in 
contracts while during the execution of the contract these details are not checked by the principal at 
all. The explanation for this is believed to be that the contractor will use his own verification process, 
one which he has checked and has proved that the design complies with the requirements set or 
deducted from the contract and that the build meets the specifications as designed.  
 
With the simple tunnel safety locker mentioned previously the detailed requirements will become 
part of the specification and the design. The contractor should prove that his design meets the 
specifications and the requirements by verifying the design. After the locker has been build, the 
contractor should also report that the locker meets the specifications by a validation test and report. 
In theory when the reports from the contractor and his systems are reliable the eventually build 
locker will meet the requirements, or if not the contractors quality process should have informed the 
principal.   
Thus, for a simple object one of the most critical processes is the verification process of the 
contractor. When it is reliable and the information it produced is complete there is no need to check 
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these details again fully. Although this sounds sensible in theory, circumstances are not always in 
favour of the system.  
 
4.3.2  Focus on Time, Budget and Availability 
 
While the SCB process is used to manage the contract the real focus seems to be on other items: the 
monthly ‘progress reports’, which  are considered a good  check point for the real issues concerning 
contract execution.  
 
Although the contract can be over specified, during the execution of the contract the principals seem 
no longer interested in these details. The main goals are leading issues: contract data, budget and 
availability of infrastructure during the building process and prevention of traffic jams.  
 
This finding raises the question whether there is a real goal congruence over the project  goals for 
both parties. Are their respective goals visible and known and how can both contractor and principal 
be supportive in realising both sides their goals? This appears to be an issue to uncover by further, 
in-depth research.  
 
4.3.3 Principal remains fully accountable for assets 
 
During the interviews, contract managers have been asked to clarify the role of the principal in 
contracting and to evaluate both his legal and political responsibility for the assets resulting from an 
infrastructure project. The degree of accountability over the project result could well be an important 
reason for Rijkswaterstaat contract managers’ reluctance to leave infrastructure products to the 
market designs, with only limited influence on the technical solutions offered by the market. There is 
fear that malfunction of privately build constructions will finally reflect on the principals 
organisation, instead of being seen as being the contractor’s responsibility. 
 
This reason needs further investigation from a social and political science perspective. 
 
4.3.4 Conclusions of Step 3 
 
One question was how contracts are actually enforced during their execution. Do contracts reflect 
and cover the most important risks identified by contract managers?  
Contracts do cover the most important technical, design and legal risks. As risk management is the 
basis for most projects there is a strong tendency to reduce the risk for a principal and transfer it to 
the contractor. Mistrust in the contractors processes and abilities leads to process requirements. 
However the main concerns or risks are safety and time. These items are not specified in depth in the 
contracts of study. The ultimate delivery time is of course included in the contract, but realising this 
date is mainly left to the contractor.  
According to the theory of System based contract management, as campaigned by RWS, audit 
processes on the execution of contracts are essential. Nevertheless the focus during execution should 
be on the most important risks. Still it is not clear whether in practice the risk management process is 
always reflecting the different risks, as this is very much depending on the background of the people 
involved. It could therefore be helpful to approach contract management risks from the following 
different perspectives: 
 A: Technical risks affecting the availability/usability/durability of the good 
 B: Environmental risks 
 C: Safety risks  
 D: Time  
 E: Budgetary risks  
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This approach could allow someone to play the ‘opportunistic contractor, looking only for his 
margin’ within the process of risk identification, but it has only rarely been used over the last years at 
RWS.  
 
As a result we may conclude from the conducted interviews with managers on contract execution 
and the enforcement process as follows: 
Q: Is management information based on the parameters specified in the contract (e.g. work 
breakdown structure elements, etc.)?  
A: No management information is usually related to budget, safety and time.  
 
Q: What are the main issues discussed in project meetings? 
A: Main issues are contract changes, claims over extra costs and external influence on scope. 
Sometimes time is allocated to technical solutions as well as legal issues.  
 
Q: Are contract incentives/disincentives (bonuses/fines) actually used?  
A: The contracts investigated lead to fines, but much less to bonuses. In case of some contracts, there 
is a tendency to use fines as a mean of putting pressure on the contractor, but seldom these fines are  
really executes. 
 
Q: Are all process requirements (data scheduled, reports prescribed, etc.) strictly followed?  
A: No, not all are followed because, as contract managers suggest, this is not their main concern. 
  
Q: Are all technical requirements necessary? 
A: No, because audits on quality assurance systems do follow design processes and there is only 
limited interest in detailed requirements. Most contract managers interviewed believe that 50% of 
technical specifications are over-complete. 
 
Given these findings, it is even more remarkable that so much effort is put in writing a detailed 
contract, while during the execution the contract is not strictly followed and technical details are not 
monitored by the principal. It is precisely on these detailed specifications that the contractor will 
monitor the demands and verify the results himself. More trust in the contractors on these items 
would would ensure a much less complete contract with only very limited increase in risc.  
 
Interviews with Contract managers involved indicate that their main concern is not whether contracts 
are followed up on in detail but that the project is realised within time and without major accidents or 
negative public opinion as a result ( for example, traffic jams). Although their main concerns stated 
are safety and time. Requirements related to these items are not specified in depth in the contracts 
investigated. The ultimate delivery deadline is indeed a clause in the contract, but the setting of 
intermediate milestones for this date is left to the contractor.  
 
As a result it is fair to suggest that my prior believe is not thorough, as contract managers do focus 
on their prime goals. It makes also clear that a lot of the detailed specifications are no issue any more 
during contract execution, as they are seldom monitored. The question why so much effort is put in 
these details seems essential for RWS’ agenda 2012. 
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5 Conclusions  
 
It appears that complex infrastructure contracts are written from a perception of mistrust in the 
ability and willingness of contractors to deliver a good technical and financial outcome. As a result, 
these contracts consist of a large number of clauses related to behavioural controls.   
 
From both a theoretical and practical point of view, it would be useful to determine whether there 
could be a prominent role for trust in complex public work contracts and whether more trust would 
ultimately lead to better performances. Such an experiment has been attempted at RWS, with little 
apparent success. 
 
The objective of this thesis was to find out whether more trust would indeed prevent contract writers 
to create even larger and more complex contracts.  Will trust ever replace formal controls or are the 
latter better to manage a contract? To answer such questions, the actual factors that determine how 
contracts are written and enforced, have been investigated.  
 
5.1 What factors drive contracts to completeness? 
 
The conclusion of this analysis is that mistrust is probably the single most important factor behind 
the writing of complete contracts, as about 50% of the requirements are not essential for the contract 
or the desired function. Therefore they can all be related to some form of mistrust. These 
requirements are about holding a firm grip on working processes, the design and chosen technical 
solutions, which were in fact supposed to be entrusted to contractors.  
 
The other factors that account for complete contracts are:  
- the fact that there  is no real sanction to write a complete contract,  
- the process orientated contract management, 
- standardisation of technical standards and the fear of malfunction if only output based 
requirements are specified, whilst RWS has gained a lot of experience with proven 
technology. 
 
5.2 Will more trust lead to less complete contracts in infrastructure projects? 
 
While searching for an answer to this question, several interesting findings have been revealed. 
 
Firstly there are some big infrastructure projects marketed as a DBFM contract, (true PPP), but most 
of the infrastructure contracts in public work remain simple Design Construct procurement contracts, 
some including a Maintenance component. 
 Secondly these PPP contracts rely on the expertise of contractors, and the financial mechanism that 
contributes to their quality (build) and performance during the maintenance phase. 
 
 Thirdly, apart from the expertise and financial strongholds, RWS has specified a strong process 
management grip in the contract to make sure that the contractor can verify design and the final 
result. 
 
Fourthly, although there seems to be a strong policy in agenda 2012 toward shifting risks and design 
to the private sector, there is still a tendency to specify technical solutions instead of the needed 
functionalities. As a result of 3 and 4 there is a large effort/cost incurred to specify a contract and to 
put it on the market. Contractors also face high transaction costs on these contracts, because of the 
need to confirm to process requirements and design methods.  
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Although by these contracts the contractor is responsible for the correct functioning of the 
infrastructure, there still is a strong accountability felt within the RWS organisation for the case of 
malfunctions, as public opinion sees no difference in contracts and points the finger at RWS as 
infrastructure supplier. 
 
 Thus, despite the long-term commitment to switching to a market philosophy, at RWS the actual 
contracts not yet reflect this new policy. Contracts preserve the tendency to be very complete and 
still do not reflect the trust that is campaigned in the business plan ‘Agenda 2012’.  
 
What do we learn from the way RWS has tried to shift contracts from input to performance-based 
contracts in PPP? 
 
If trust would play a more prominent role in the contract design (i.e. result in less complete 
contracting), this might well lead to a better performance during the execution of the contract and 
even a better product at less cost.   
If specifications and process controls would not be so comprehensive, most detail would be the 
craftsmanship of the contractor, and the technical solutions which might be created could be more 
efficient. 
 
To really leave things open for contractors though needs another focus within contract teams, not 
only time and money should be a prominent factor, also improving the goals and durability of the 
solutions, (Life cycle approach) should be a prominent key performance indicator. Controls by the 
principal should focus on project risks but also on identified cost drivers, safety, environment and 
durability.  A more prominent role for goal congruence in contracts might be an essential step to 
achieve the desired close cooperation between contractors and RWS. 
 
5.3 Do complete contracts reduce transaction costs or reduce risk?  
 
The results found in this research do not fully clarify this question. However, neither has the author 
found evidence opposing the following believes: 
 
- The investigated complete contracts, both outcome based but also detailed to solutions and 
process, do not reduce transaction costs for both parties, but do reduce risks for the principal; 
 
- Leaner contracts, which focus on the function and the main results, are likely to reduce 
transaction costs. These do increase risk but only risks concerning minor details, that have 
proven not to be an item during the execution of the contract; 
 
- Social controls play no major role in the reviewed contracts, trust is mostly based on 
behavioural controls; 
 
- Complete contracts are not executed or fully enforced. There is always room for 
optimization and there is no in depth outcome control, as this is left to the contractor within 
the boundaries of his verification and validation process; 
  
- Contract writers are risk avoiding: as a result contracts are specified in detail to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour from contractors. Some clauses are due to inertia. There is no direct 
penalty for a complete contract, it takes more time to create, but it also reduces risks for 
people involved. From a management view there could be a different perspective, as 
‘complete’ contracts might well interfere with supposed cooperation between contractors 
and principals.  
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5.4 Limitations and Recommendations for further research 
 
This investigation is limited to three contracts conceived by one single agency of the Dutch 
government: Rijkswaterstaat. Further investigation within other sectors may lead to other results or 
insights. 
 
The effects on social behaviour and personal contacts can play a major role in contract execution, 
trust and cooperation. This, together with the effect on the type of contract (completeness), seems a 
relevant avenue for further investigation. 
 
The rational choice between complete contracts and incomplete contracts from a management point 
of view seems  uncertain, therefore a further exploration of this aspect could be relevant  to many 
organisations. 
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Annex A: contents of a typical design and construct contract model. 
 
For example, a standard used for these more integrated contract forms (design, construct, eventually 
maintain) is UAV GC 2005. The UAV GC 2005 contains a set of regulations and standards that have 
been agreed between both contractors and public principals. As a result any infrastructure contract, 
written by Rijkswaterstaat and referring to the UAV GC, consists of: 
 
A. Documents for selection and tender: 
 Selection document 
When a pre-selection is deemed necessary the terms and demands regarding experience and know-
how are given in this document. Only the potential contractors (“Contractors”) that fulfil the 
requirements established in this document pre-qualify for entering the tender process. A pre-selection 
usually limits the number of Contractors in the tendering process to 5, as to minimize transaction 
costs. A lottery is sometimes used in case there are too many Contractors that qualify. 
 
 Tender document 
In this document is specified how the bids will be judged and ranked, and how the offer should be 
presented. This document also contains the details of the tender process.  
 
B. Contract documents 
 
 General letter of understanding 
This document contains the most important set of agreements, like delivery time, price, and 
penalties. 
 
 Annexes 
In these documents the supplementary contract details are provided.  
 
 Specifications 1 
In this document the technical and functional demands are specified. This is usually a tailored set of 
demands, for a specific project. 
 
 Specifications 2 
In this document all process demands are noted. It usually prescribes the way the contractor should: 
- manage the contract,  
- assure and audit the quality,  
- manage the environment,  
- design and verify the design, 
- verify and test the results, 
- set a financial payment,  
- inform the principal. 
 
From the contracts can be derived a major part of the total requirements, it is now based on processes 
from “Vraagspecificatie 2”: 
Management plan, 
Various process plans 
Safety and health plan, 
Traffic plan, 
Communication plan to principal, 
Work breakdown structure 
Legal register, 
Environment plan 
Design:  
Verification plan, design philosophy, verification report, 
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Validation, testingplan, survey and approval plan,  
Audit plan, audit result, 
Integral management 
Procurement plan, 
Financial schedule. 
 
 Contractors offers/bid 
This document specifies the following: 
- price, 
- offered quality as demanded in the tender documents on quality build and processes. 
- usually a more or less complete project management plan. 
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Annex B Questionnaire for contract managers and their answers 
 
               
            true neutral false 
Process requirements force contractors to deliver a good result       4 1 2 
A contractor that conformities to RWS process standards delivers a good result      1 4 2 
Contracts that do specify technical requirements to detail lead to good results        3 4 
Contracts that are specified to functions only have led to better solutions      3 3 1 
Systems engineering leads to better solutions        4 2 1 
Systems engineering (to functions) will safe money        4 1 2 
The obligation to follow the contractors own quality system has lead to better results     3 3 1 
The obligation to follow the contractors own quality system will lead to better results     5 2   
A contract can never be executed to the full details: there is some room for interpretation     6 1   
Contractors do the utmost to realise principals' goals concerning time, money and quality,        3 4 
Contractors main goal is to realise his own financial targets       5 2   
Contractors are only interested in principals goals as a financial incentive is involved     2 3 2 
Incomplete contracts will almost certainly NOT lead to contractors claims as result of a possible  
room for interpretations  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      1            2 4  
Contractors are very concerned about the contractor-principal relationship        4 3   
RWS contracts are over-complete and specified to unnecessary detail.      6 1     
RWS contracts are smart and efficient           4 3   
RWS contracts lack process requirements         1   6   
Some Process requirements can easy be left out, as they are never executed      5 1 1   
RWS is very well capable to judge the contractors results       2 3 2   
Cooperation on a trustworthy base will lead to a better realisations of goals      5 2     
Principals goals are a fixed item on regular project meetings.       1 3 3   
With some more trust and reliance in the market project would be executed more efficient     4 3     
                    
                    
Finally: please rank / score the parameters underneath considering a project:            
1 most important, 8 least important               
                  
time     3 24            
money      28            
quality (result)    2 21            
quality during execution    31            
Explicit and verifiable working process   26            
Verifiable working as per process requirements   44            
cooperation     32            
safety at building area   1 10           
        
(one contractmanager did 
not fill)      
                               
                 
                 
                 
                
 
 
 
                                                     
 
